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ARTICLE
Two Conceptions Of An Environmental Ethic
And Their Implications
A.

Introduction

It is becoming all too clear that,
unless radical steps are taken, we are
in danger of maiming our environment
and many of its nonhuman inhabitants
beyond recognition.
The problems
res u Iti ng from poll ution, depletion of
the earth's resources, and economic
development at the expense of land,
ai r,
and
water grow
increasi ngly
severe.
Animals are being. deprived
of their habitats, and species are
becoming endangered or extinct at an
alarming rate.
It is imperative that
we change our environmental policies.
Effective policy changes require a
coherent ethical basis, however, and
environmentalists thus far have not
been noted for their philosophical
unity.
Many different positions have
been taken, from the allegedly "mod
erate" attitude of a William Ruckel
shaus, to the advocacy of ecological
sabotage by "Earth First," a group
inspired by a novel (Edward Abbey's
The Monkey Wrench Gang) in which
machines are trashed, bridges blown
up, and human life treated cavalierly
at best. 1
Ecologist Garrett Hardin
quite seriously proposes that wilder
ness areas contain no emergency roads
and
that
backpackers
who
get
stranded fi nd thei r own way out or
die (to bring in helicopters would
defile the serene beauty of the sur
roundings).2 The diversity of envi
ronmentalist views, many of them with
unpalatable
consequences
to
most
humans, has made environmentalism an
easy ta rget for its detractors.
A coherent envi ronmental eth ic is
necessa ry for the resol ution of th is
situation.
But how can such an ethic

be formulated and what would its
implications be for human and nonhu
man animals?
Are those implications
morally defensible? I will not attempt
to give a comprehensive treatment of
all the issues that have been raised
by the growing literature on environ
mental ethics.
Rather,', will consider
the two major rival conceptions of an
environmental ethic which are emerg
ing from the literature: individualism
and holism. I will sketch what I take
the implications of each for humans
and nonhumans to be, then discuss
important objections to each view.
I
wi II a rgue that the individual istic con
ception has more to recommend it from
the moral point of view.
However,
the holistic approach has merit also,
and I will try to show that an ade
quate environmental ethic should con
tain elements from both conceptions.
B. Preliminary Distinctions
I will begin with some necessary
distinctions. By 'ethic' I mean a com
prehensive, coherent set of principles
of value and obligation.
Of the two
types of principles, those concerning
value are more fundamental.
The
moral rightness of an act depends,
wholly or in part, on whether it pro
motes
that which
is
intrinsically
valuable; i. e., val uable for its own
sake.
Beings are intrinsically valua
ble to the extent to wh ich they poss
ess certain properties.
Just which
properties those a re must be deter
mined by an ethic's theory of value.
Some candidates are:
having the
capacity to experience pleasu re or
happiness; having the capacity for
knowledge; having the capacity for
freedom; beauty,
harmony, health,
a nd life.
Such properties, a nd the
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events or states
of affa irs wh ich
exemplify them, are morally relevant
according to an ethic, but only beings
can be said to have moral standing or
to be morally considerable.
Because
of the properties certain beings have,
we are obligated to consider how they
would be affected by a given action or
policy.
Morally considerable beings
are valuable in their own right.
It
follows that it wou Id be wrong to treat
them as instrumentally valuable only;
i.e., as mere instruments for the pro
duction of other value. 3
An ethic
must determine which beings are to
count as morally considerable, and it
must do so on the basis of morally
relevant characteristics.
It must also
arrive at a nonarbitrary criterion of
moral significance which will allow for
the resol ution of confl icts among mor
ally considerable beings.
An ethic is environmental if and
only if it accords moral standing to
some
non sentient
beings. 4
Some
plants,
natural objects, or systems
must cou nt as bei ng val uable in thei r
own right.
An ethic which classifies
all such beings as merely instrumen
tally
valuable
would
be,
in
Tom
Regan's words, an ethic " for the use
of the envi ronment," 5 not an envi ron
mental ethic.
An environmental ethic
is not a narrowly focused set of prin
ciples pertaining only to what we call
"environmental issues."
It will have
implications for all beings with moral
standing, whoever or whatever they
may be.
What beings have moral standing?
According to the individualistic con
ception of an environmental
ethic,
on Iy
i ndivid ual
entities
(hereafter,
simply 'individuals') can be morally
considerable, be they humans, non hu
man animals, or redwoods.
On such a
view, ecosystems and species have no
mora I sta nd i ng.
Accord i ng to the
holistic conception of an environmental
ethic, it is complex systems of indi
viduals ('beings' in a broad sense of
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the term) which have moral standing:
i n d iv i d u a I s ass u c h h a v e non e . I wi II
refer to these views as envi ronmental
individualism and environmental ho
lism, respectively.
How is one to evaluate these two
conceptions of an environmental ethic?
How can one determine whether either
is more justifiable than a more tradi
tonal ethic for the use of the environ
ment?
It would be impossible to dis
cuss
the
vast
literature
on
the
meaning and justification of ethical
views here, so I will simply offer a
proposal
which
most
contemporary
eth ical theorists accept.
Whatever it
may mean to say that a human, fox,
lake or species is intrinsically valua
ble, it is plain that one's judgment
must meet some minimal criteria.
If
one's judgment is (1) not informed
about the relevant facts, including the
information one gains about sentient
beings through empathy, or (2) is not
clearly thought out, or (3) is not
impartial, or (4) is not universaliza
ble, then that judgment is not justi
fied.
Conversely, if a judgment· of
intrinsic value meets all these condi
tions, it is as justified as an ethical
judgment can ever be:
it is well-con
sidered.
Therefore, the ethics
in
question will be tested by taking the
moral point of view:
we will· try to
determi ne whether they stand up to
clear,
informed,
impartial
scrutiny
when universaliz·ed.
We can call this
an appeal to those famous "ethical
intuitions," provided we never forget
that those i ntu itions must be well-con
sidered.
An appeal to such intuitions
is not to be confused with an appeal
to simplistic moral biases.
Those phi
losophers who attack the method of
appealing to intuitions are really just
objecting to the latter practice. G

C. The Failure of the
Homocentric Eth ic
Before
tu rn i ng
individualism
and

to
envi ronmental
holism,
\et
us
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briefly consider their traditional rival:
the homocentric ethic.
According to
it, all and only human beings have
moral standing.
Nonhuman animals,
plants, or natural objects have value
only in so far as they serve human
interests. The chief theoretical defect
of the homocentric ethic is the arbi
trary natu re of its criterion of moral
considerability.
To exclude from the
realm of moral considerability those
nonhuman animals who differ from
(some) humans in no respect other
than species-membership is to be
guilty of a kind of thinking akin to
racism, as Peter Singer has argued. 7
Apart from this devastating defect,
moreover, the homocentric ethic fails
to accord with ou r considered views
about envi ronmental preservation.
It
is, of course, true that enlightened,
long- range
homo-sapiens-interest
would justify many environmentally
sound policies:
e.g., the halting of
fu rther depletion of the ozone layer
by fl uoroca rbon s, th e red u ction of
other air, land, and water pollution
that harms humans, and the safer
disposition of toxic wastes. Surely we
cou Id improve upon some of ou r cu r
rent "caretakers" who, believing that
the Second Coming is at hand, think
there will be no future generations to
benefit from a clean envi ronment.
Nevertheless, the homocentric eth ic
cannot go far enough.
Its fatal flaw,
as Eric Katz has argued, is its making
envi ronmental preservation conti ngent
on human attitudes:
Basing arguments for environ
mental
preservation
on
the
premises of utilitarian moral
theory will only reveal the
precarious relationship which
ex i sts between the sati sfaction
of human needs and the pres
ervation of natural objects. 8
There are many species of animals and
plants which few humans value, whose
extinction would not harm us:
e.g.,

s na i I-da rters, d us ky-footed wood rats,
the furbish lousewort (an unassuming
and rare little plant), and perhaps
even the timber wolf. 9 As the case of
the Tellico Dam shows, elimination of
some species may result from policies
which benefit humans economically and
recreationally.
(Fortunately for the
snail-darters, they have another habi
tat which is as yet uncoveted by
humans.)
Human interests might be
better satisfied if we reduced the
number of animal species, putting
thei r former habitats to economically
better use.
Why not follow the gen
eral policy which we see pursued in
Borneo, where orangutans are losing
thei r forest homes to fa rms? We cou Id
save cute, cuddly, and bizarre repre
sentatives of some of these species for
display in zoos, where they are so
much easier to see and enjoy. Turn
ing to some non sentient parts of our
envi ronment, we have al ready seen
the sh ri n kage of the amou nt of parks
and wilderness areas in the public
domain.
Those that remain are often
polluted
(from
an
environmentalist
point of view)
by superhighways,
motels,
restaurants,
laundromats,
motorcycles, motorboats, snowmobiles
and land-rovers.
Far too many areas
have been "Yosemitized." Yet, these
measures may well have resulted in a
greater amount of human satisfaction.
For every furious Sierra Club mem
ber, there a re many contented tou
rists.
Moreover, it might be very benefi
cial from a homocentric point of view
to alter some envi ronmental attitudes
which many people still have. Martin
Krieger, in an article in Science called
"What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?,"
a rgues that
the demand for ra re envi ron
ments is a learned one.
It
also seems likely that conscious
public choice can manipulate
this learning so that the envi
ronments which people learn to
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use and want reflect environ
ments that a re likely to be
available at low cost ... What's
wrong with plastic trees?
My
guess is that there is very lit
tle wrong . with them.
Much
more can be done with plastic
trees and the like to give most
people. the feeling that they
are experiencing nature. 10
Would it even be all that difficult to
change
people's
attitudes
in
this
direction?
Plastic flowers and artifi
cial house plants are already favored
by many, as are fake-animal lawn
ornaments.
Why not put astrotu rf
under the ceramic deer, chicks, bun
nies, and flamingoes?
Many people
already find the charms of mechanical
beasts
in the wilds of Disneyland
much more appealing than those of
thei r less entertai ni ng natu ra I cou nt
erparts.
We would not need to make
the special, costly efforts which pres
ervation of rare environments and wild
animals call for if most people became
satisfied with cheap replacements.

113
humans, sentient nonhuman animals,
and some plants and natural objects.
This ethic has two chief advantages
over a homocentric ethic.
First, it
does not accord moral standing on the
basis of a morally irrelevant charac
teristic:
species.
It is in agreement
with the considered view that sentient
nonhuman animals have value in their
own right, that they a re not to be
regarded
as mere
instruments
for
h uma n gratification.
Second, such a
view impl ies that extensive exploita
tion, poll ution, and plastification of
the envi ronment is wrong, even if it
cou Id be done without ha rmi ng the
chances
for
human
survival
and
enjoyment.
This too,
I
maintain,
agrees with our considered views.
Environmental individualism makes nei
ther nonhuman animals nor wilderness
areas hostage to the preferences peo
ple happen to have.
Thus,
it is
superior from the moral point of view
to the homocentric ethic.
However,
severa I serious objections have been
pressed against environmental individ
ualism.
Let us consider each in turn.

It is evident that the homocentric
eth ic ma kes the envi ronment, as well
as individual animals, hostage to the
interests which
humans
happen to
have.
These interests frequently run
counter to environmental preservation.
I maintain that reflection about our
"Yosemitized" parks and the prospect
of environmental plastification shows
this implication to be unacceptable.
Since it does not accord with our con
sidered view, the homocentric eth ic
fails to be an adequate ethic for the
use of the environment.

1. Holists have charged that envi
ronmental individualism is objection
ably atomistic.
E.g.,
Alistair Gunn
argues that

D. Environmental Individualism

The same objection is made more fully
by Kenneth Goodpaster,
in a fre
quently cited article critical of indi
vidualism in ethics:

Let us see whether environmental
individualism is an improvement on the
homocentric eth ic.
Some recent p ro
ponents of this view have been Chris
topher Stone,ll Tom Regan,12 and
Donald Scherer. 13 Environmental indi
vidualism accords moral standing to

[Holistic]
environmentalism
seems
incompatible
with
the
'Western' obsession with indi
vidualism, which leads us to
resolve
questions about
ou r
treatment of animals by appeal
ing to the essentially atomistic,
competitive
notion.,
of
rights ... 14

I am convi nced that the mere
en la rgement of the class of
morally considerable beings is.
an inadequate substitute for a
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genuine environmental ethic.
the
oft- repeated
plea
by
some ecologists and environ
mentalists that
our thinking
needs to be less atomistic and
more 'holistic' translates into a
plea
for
a
more
embraci ng
object of moral consideration.
I n a sense, it represents a
plea to retu rn to the richer
G reek conception of a man by
nature social and not intelligi
bly removable from his social
and political context-though it
goes beyond the Greek concep
tion in emphasizing that socie
ties too need to be understood
in a context,
an
ecological
context, and that it is this
la rger
whole
that
is
"the
bearer of value. 1l15
The objection is that any ethic which
restricts moral standing to individu
als, be they sentient or nonsentient,
ignores the mutual dependencies of
individuals and the larger ecological
context which includes them.
It is
these large systems which are intrin
sically valuable, not the individuals
they include.
I believe this objection to be dou
bly mista ken.
Fi rst, it attacks a
"straw ethic.
No one who advocates
an individualistic ethic, whether or
not it includes non sentient beings, is
unaware of the mutual dependencies of
individuals and their reliance on land,
air, and water for existence.
Of
course individuals do not exist in iso
lation.
To paraphrase John Donne,
no lousewort "is an island unto itself.
Second, it simply does not follow that
if an individual is a member of a large
complex whole, without which it could
not exist, the whole rather than the
individual must be "the bearer" of
intrinsic value.
Would we say that a
child who is a member of a richly
complex family unit thereby lacks all
value in his own right, the family
(not
its
members!)
alone
having
11

intrinsic value?
The inference is a
non
sequitur.
Thus
environmental
individualism survives .this objection.
2. An objection has been raised
against proponents of "animal libera
ti 0 n " w h i ch a I so a p p lies to en v i ro n 
mental individualists. Views according
to which sentient beings, regardless
of their origins and special character
istics, are morally considerable are
sa id to confl ict with ou r considered
intuitions that wild animals are of
vastly greater value than domestic
animals. J. Baird Callicott writes that
there is "a sharp distinction between
the
very
different
plights
(and
rights)
of wi Id a nd domestic ani
mals. "16
He suggests that domestic
animals have little or no moral stand
ing:
Domestic animals are creations
of man~
They are living arti
facts, but a rtifacts neverthe
less, and they constitute yet
another mode of extension of
the works of man into the eco
system.
From the perspective
of the land ethic a herd of
cattle,
sheep or pigs is as
much or more a ruinous blight
on the landscape as a fleet of
fou r-wheel-d rive off the road
veh icles. 17
Domestic animals are said to be objec
tionable human artifacts, having been
"bred to docility, tractability, stupid
ity and dependency."ls Wild animals,
on the other hand, have much more
admirable qualities, qualities without
which they could not have survived.
It is the latter, Callicott suggests,"
not the former, which our intuitions
tell us a refit objects of our concern.
They belong in the world in which
they
have
naturally
evolved;
the
pathetically unfit creatures of ou r own
making do not.
The
inhumane
treatment
of
pen ned domestics
s hou Id not
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be, I suggest, even discussed
in the same context as whaling
and wildlife traffic; it is a dis
service to do so. 19

I .

I n reply to this objection, it should
fi rst be noted that envi ronmental i ndi
vidual ism need not imply that domestic
and wild animals have equal intrinsic
value. To say that they are all mor
ally considerable is not yet to say
t hat they s h 0 u Id be g ive nth e s a me
degree of moral consideration.
To
th ink otherwise is to confuse the cri
terion of moral considerability with the
criterion of moral significance. 2o Sec
ond, it does indeed seem plausible
that domestic andwil.d animals ought
to be accorded different treatment,
but the difference ought to be in
favor
of
the
domestic
animals.
Doesn't the manner in which wedelib
erately
created
these
creatu res
increase rather than decrease ou r
obligation to them? Consider the fol
lowing parallel.
We believe that we
have special responsibilities to those
humans whom we bring into existence
in accordance with
our culturally
inculcated
preferences for
certain
numbers and sex distributions of pro
geny, at I,east u nti I they are matu re.
But whbt if we arranged it so that
they did not reach maturity?
Sup
pose, a la Aldous Huxley, we used
genetic engineering techniques to cre
ate human beings who were deliber
ately stunted into docile bovine idi
ocy. We might save some pa rticularly
attractive ones for pets, but most wi II
be put to work. We train them to do
the jobs not fit for i ntell igent sen si
tive: humans, we use them for experi
ments which will benefit us, often
causing them agony, and we eat the
tasty ones after subjecting them to
factory-farming techniques that cause
them great misery. (Dimwitted though
they a re, they sti II have the capacity
to suffer, as do domestic animals.) It
seems to me that we wou Id owe these
creatures a great deal,
including
moral consideration.
From the moral

lis
p~int
of view, the plight of OLi r
stunted domestic humans is on all
fou rs with the pi ig ht of ou r domestic
animals.
I can only conclude that we
have greater, not lesser, moral obli
gation s to these dependent "a rtifacts"
than to thei r independent wi Id abori
ginal progenitors.
This conclusion
squa res well with the envi ronmentalist
view that wild animals ought not to be
interfered with unless interference is
required to restore a balance we ear
lier disturbed.
Thus, it seems that
environmental individualism does not
conflict with our considered views
about domestic and wild animals after
all.

3; It has been objected that the
extension of an ethic to include non
human
or
non sentient
individuals
stretches ou r moral concepts out of all
recbgn ition.
Goodpaster
puts this
objection well:
The
"individualistic"
model
strains our moral sensitivities
and intuitions to the breaking
point,
inviting talk of the
"rights of animals, " from dol
phins to mosquitoes; "rights,"
and even duties, of natu ral
objects Ii ke trees and rivers;
"chauvinism"; and court suits
brought in the names of per
sonified species or even his
torical landmarks. 21
I must co'nfess that I do not fi.nd tal k
of animal rights to be counter-intui
tive, provided the animals are sen
tient, but the extension of such tal k
to nonsentient bei ngs is another mat
ter:
One does indeed quail at the
thought of carrying
banners for
rocks' rights and lousewort liberation.
Does the Mississippi river have the
rigoht not to have its cou rse altered
by Louisiana civil engineers? Do red
woods have duties to squ i rrels?
A
view which has such implications is
very suspect.
Some versions of
environmental individualism are open
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to this objection.
E.g., law professor
Christopher Stone argues that "it is
not unthinkable" to accord rights to
natural objects like rivers, trees, and
rocks, and he believes humans ought
to rep resent those ri g hts in cou rts of
law. 22
Why
not
"unthinkable?"
Revealingly, Stone ties his view to a
Whiteheadian idealism which accords
consciousness to all natu ra I objects,
including plants and rocks and even
atoms.
He even recommends that we
regard the entire planet as a con
sciou s entity. 23
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some of the latter as being morally
considerable.
But at this point, the
objection re-emerges:
does not such
a suggestion stretch ou r concept of
moral considerability out of all recog
nition?28
An excellent case can be
made for the moral considerability of
sentient individuals, who have inter
ests ina nontrivial sense, but on
what grounds can moral considerability
be extended to plants and mountains?

It is not clear whether Stone
believes this to be true or is simply
proposing it as a useful "myth. "24 If
it is just a myth, and we have every
reason to believe that it is, it can
hardly justify any rights ascriptions
to non sentient objects.
To accord
rights to rocks, at least, is to do
violence to the concept of rights, a
concept wh ich, as Joel Fei n berg has
argued, entails that every rights
holder has interests. 25
It makes
sense to say that sentient bei ngs have
interests, but what about nonsentient
beings? In a very stretched sense of
'interest,' we can attribute interests
to, e.g., grass (it needs sun and
water) .
But then we can also say
that lawnmowers have an interest in
having their engines oiled and their
blades sharpened.
As Bryan Norton
argues, if we base rights-ascriptions
on such a watered-down concept of
interests, they become enti rely a rbi
trary.26 Thus objection (3) has con
siderable force against views which
ascribe rights to non sentient beings.

One possible reply is that whatever
exists is, simply by virtue of its
existence, morally considerable.
If
th is were the case, the enti re bu rden
on envi ronmental individualism wou Id
be shifted to its criterion of moral
significance: all the "claims" of mor
a II y con s ide r a b l e i n d iv id u a Is
( i . e. ,
eve rybody) wou Id h ave to be ra n k -0 r
derd in a nonarbitrary way.
Perhaps
t his co u Id be do n e, but it is do u btf u I
that this challenge really must be met.
For, how can existence be a morally
relevant characteristic? Leaving aside
the difficulty of whether it can be a
cha racteristic at all, one wonders why
existence as such should matter. One
tends to shake one's head, with John
Rodma n, at Zen masters who rega rd
a II t h i n gsa sin
sintt r in sica \I y val u a b Ie,
including smog. 29 Short of adopting
a theological perspective (which would
yoke environmental individualism to
some very questionable assumptions),
it is hard to see how merely existing
should entitle one to moral consider
ability.
Moreover,
reflection about
future generations suggests that exis
tence may not even be necessary for
such status.

However, envi ronmental i ndividual
ism need have no such implication.
The concepts of 'having a right' and
'being morally considerable' are not
coextensive,
as Goodpaster himself
points out. 27 We may accord all sen
tient beings rights (though not neces
sarily
the
same
rights)
without
accordi ng
rights
to
nonsentient
beings, while nevertheless regarding

What, then, must the criterion of
moral
considerabi Iity be?
If any
beings are not to count as morally
considerable, the exclusion must be
based on morally relevant characteris
tics. This problem must be solved' if
environmental individualism is to be
taken seriously.
Rather than do an
ex haustive su rvey of recent attempts
to
solve
the
problem
and
their
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difficulties,3o I will offer a sugges
tion.
There are certain qualities
which some naturally occurring non
sentient individuals have which make
them
i ntri nsically
val uable;
e. g. ,
beauty, rna rvelous adaption to thei r
environments, uniqueness, their con.;.
tribution to the diversity on this
planet.
There is a whole cluster of
aesthetic qual ities, one ot more of
which are possessed by individuals
such as the Grand Canyon, a redwood
tree, a stone worn smooth by a river,
a bee, and a specimen of furbish
lousewort. (Sentient beings may have
such qualities too, but these qualities
are not the primary source of their
moral considerability,
as discussed
above.)
Beings which are intrinsi
cally valuable in any of these ways
ought to be taken into account when
we make a moral decision, even if
they are nonsentient.
Just as we
ought not wanton Iy to deface Miche
langelo's Pi-eta, we ought not to make
picn'ic tables out of a 2000-year-old
living redwood.
Careful,
informed
reflection about the redwood and even
about the un remarkable but rare fu r
bish lousewort will result in our admi
ration
and
regard.
Examples of
bei ngs wh ich would not cou nt as bei ng
morally considerable on these grounds
are:
a plant or nonsentient animal
which, due to a disastrous mutation,
has
become unfit for su rvival, and
has no other redeemi ng
aesthetic
qualities; a non sentient bei ng wh ich is
not in the least ra re and has no other
over-riding
aesthetic
value;
most
human junk, . such as plastic milk
jugs; and smog.
The appeal to values such as
beauty, harmohY, diversity, and uni
queness is hardly shockingly new:
they have been on the lists of plural.;.
istic value theorists since Plato's time.
Only hedonists are apt to balk at
them, and hedonism is a very dubious
theory of value.
What will disturb
even non hedon ists, however, is the
suggestion that such qualities have a
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place in an envi ronmental ethic. Is it
not homocentric to grant beings moral
considerability on aesthetic grounds?
Are- we not making plants and natu
rally occurring objects hostage to
human aesthetic preferences in the
same way in wh ich the homocentric
ethic makes all nonhuman entities hos
tage to human interests?
This is a very serious objection,
but I believe it can
be handled.
First, the hornocentricethic regards
all nonhuman individuals, sentient or
nonse'ntient, as instrumentally val uable
only.
They merely contribute. to
intrinsically valuable human experi
ences.
Now, it is true that human
aesthetic expetientes are intrinsically
worthwhile, but the suggestion that
nons-entient beings wh ich have certai n
aesthetic qualities be morally consid
erable entails that they are intrinsi
cally valuable also.
The aesthetic
experiences we have are a response to
these bei ngs, not the sou rce of thei r
merelV i-nstrumental value.
I believe
reflection bears this out.
Consider
one's response to a strip-mined moun
tain.
Suppose that all the sentient
life which th.at part of the mountain
had supported has been moved to an
even
more congenial
envi ronment.
Apart from instrumental considerations
(such as the economic benefits of the
strip.;.mining), isn't one distressed at
what has been done?
It is not the
loss of pleasurable aesthetic experi
ences for present and future humans
that we mourn, it is the muti lation of
themou nta in. It is the object of our
distress, not any missing experiences.
Th us there is a crucial disanalogy
between th is view and the homocentric
ethic.
But, it may now be objected,
although it is true that envi ronmental
individualis'm does not make human
beings morally prior in the way the
homocentri c eth ic does, are we not
assigning moral considerability on a
"-subJective," thus arbitrary, human

118
basis?
Whatever non sentient beings
humans happen to find aesthetically
appealing make the cut, whereas oth
ersdo not:
they are hostage, so the
objection goes, to h uma n aesthetic
preferences.
A successful reply to
this objection will have to draw the
distinction between what merely seems
to be aesthetically valuable and what
is aesthetically valuable.
Aesthetic
judgments
are
no more
subjective
whims than are other value judgments.
They must both receive the same test:
they must be well-considered and as
free from bias as possible.
Certainly
this is a very difficu It u nderta ki ng
but then so is the making and testing
of any value judgment.
This is no
ground for despair, but a challenge to
work in the area of environmental
aesthetics. 3 1
I conclude that environmental indi
vidualism has
not been
shown to
stretch ou r concept of moral consider
ability out of all recognition, although
some versions of it do distort the
concept of rights and thus ought to
be rejected.
The next objection focuses on the
criterion of moral significance.
It has
been objected that environmental indi
vidualism, by extending the range of
the
morally
considerable
to
some
plants and natural ·objects, leads to a
virtually impossible task:
the neces
sity of resolving the many conflicting
claims of humans, non human animals,
plants, mountains, etc.
This is the
objection. which inspi red John Rod
man's puzzled question:
"My God,
should we give 'America' back to the
'Indians'.
. or [to] the sumac?"32
Several other philosophers have also
raised this objection. 33
One thing is clear:
one cannot
avoid the objection by decla ri ng that
all morally considerable beings are
equally
valuable.
Consider
Albert
Schweitzer's claim that
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[The ethical man] does not ask
how far
this
or
that
life
deserves sympathy as valuable
in itself, not how fa r it is
capable of feeling.
To him,
life as such is sacred. 34
Whom should one save:
the human
being or the anopheles mosquito? As
Norton poi nts out, the res u It of such
an ethic is moral paralysis. 3s Unless
one were to resort to an inordinate
amount of coin-tossing, inconsistency
is the only answer for the moral agent
who accepts this view.
Schweitzer
was quite admi rably inconsistent:
he
cut down jungle to build his hospital
in central Africa and labored mightily
against the interests of the anopheles
mosquito. 36
The religion of Jai n ism in I ndia has
compa rable difficu Ities.
The fi rst of
five sacred vows which a Jain must
make is "not to destroy life of any
ki nd. "
Followers go to heroic lengths
to carry out the vow:
e.g., they
refuse to farm because plowing and
harvesting kills innocent plants and
insects; they don't walk in the dark
for fear of murdering unseen grass
and insects; thei r "s ky-clad" mon ks
wear no clothes, refuse to bathe or
brush their teeth (too many microbe
lives would be wiped out by such
action s), and wea r face-mas ks to p re
vent thei r
inadvertently swa Ilowi ng
insects.
They are lacto-vegetarians
who eat on Iy plants wh ich a re certifi
ably dead (but not by murder! ) and
who ins i st 0 n bo iii n g ( !) the i r mil k
and water.
Nevertheless, consistency
with the first vow is forever impossi
ble.
Even those mon ks who choose to
sta rve to death rather tha n conti nue
destroying
life destroy
their own
lives. 37
The primary purpose of an ethic is
to serve as an action guide for the
achievement of certain worthy goals.
If those goals can never be achieved,
the action guide is a failure.
In both
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of the above reverence-for-life eth ics,
th is is a di rect 'consequence of the
refusal to adopt a criterion for moral
significance.
How then can confl icts be resolved
by an
envi ronmental
individualist?
Donald Scherer, whose own view is
primarily individualistic,. suggests that
"the way to deal with conflicts of
positive val ues is th ree-fold:
avoid
them,
dissolve them,
or minimize
them. "38 This is good advice, but in
whose favor do we minimize unavoida
ble conflicts? I think that a pLausible
view would have to imply that bei ngs
with interests (not in the stretched
sense of 'interest' which applies to
grass and lawnmowers), i. e., beings
capable of having rights, should have
preference over nonsentient entities,
which, though they have moral stand
ing, cannot plausibly be regarded as
. rights-holders.
rights- holders.
For
example,
the
aesthetic value of a specimen of the
hepatitis vi rus ,wh ich is rna rvelously
well-adapted to its environment, is far
outweighed by the death and suffering
it and its fellows cause for sentient
beings.
Conflicts among rights-hold
ers are more difficult to resolve,
though
this
problem
is
hardly
restricted to an environmental ethic.
It i s plausible to say, as Singer and
Regan have argued, that we ought not
to sacrifice significant interests of
beings, such as life, freedom, and
happiness, to the less significant
interests of others, such as a liking
for Kentucky-fried chicken.
When
there is an unavoidable clash of sig
nificant interests, all the relevant
factors in the case must be takeni nto
aC.cou.nt and an
impartial decision
made. There can be no easy answers
here, and one shQuJd be suspicious of
a. vi.ew wh ich offers them.
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To object to an ethic on the ground
that it impl ies that there a re a vast
number of conflicts to resolve is not
to the point.
Following this reason
ing, an ethic with the smallest possi
ble scope of moral considerability
wou Id be the best. Fi rst-person ego
ism ("an act is right if and only if it
maximizes my long- range expectable
utility") would w'in the competition
hands down.
Thus, as this reductio
argument
indicates,
objection
(4)
against . envi ronmental
individualism
also fails.
5. However, we now come to an
objection which I do not think can be
defeated.
I n the discussion of objec
. tion (3) above, it was argued that
certain aesthetic characteristics make
some nonsentient individuals morally
considerable (though they are insuffi
cient, unlike the characteristic of
sentience, to make them rights- hold
ers). But this same line of reasoning
leads to th.e concl usion that some
richly complex wholes are intrinsically
valuable too.
A ca refu lIy balanc.ed
ecosystem
is
beautiful
in
many
respects. Even a very drab (at fi rst
glance) wilderness area, such as the
100 acres of California sage and chap
pa ral wh ich Rodman fought to keep
from
being
replaced
by
a
golf
course, 39
has
harmony ,
stability,
order, and variety. Whole systems of
th is kind, i ncl udi ng thei r subsystems,
have aesthetic value.
They too,
then; are morally considerable.
The
restriction of moral considerability to
individuals is arbitrary.
Therefore,
although environmental indivi.dualism is
vastly Jess arbitrary than the homo
centric ethic, it too fails to be an
ad.equate ethic.
It must either be
supplemented or replaced enti rely.
E. Environmental Holism

Th.e main point is this: if a very
large n umber of bei ngs have moral
standing, then we must work out a
way of resolving conflicts among them,
no m,atter how difficult this may be.

It is tempting at this point to
escape to a replacement: environ men 
tal .holism. According to it, individu
als have instrumenta\ or derivative
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value only:
it is the richly complex
wholes which include them' that are
intrinsically valuable.
Which richly
complex wholes?
The usual answer
given
is ecosystems.
The classic
statement of this view was given by
Aldo Leopold, who called it "the land
ethic":
A thing is right when it tends
to preserve the i nteg rity, sta
bility, and beauty of the biotic
community.
It is wrong when
it tends otherwise. 40
One may embrace a "global" holism,
according to which the "fundmental
bearer of value" is the entire ecosys
tem on this planet, or one may accord
moral considerability to smaller richly
complex wholes such as wilderness
areas. Whichever version of environ
mental hoi i smon e chooses, however, it
wi II have the same impl ication for
individuals:
they have no value in
their own right.
Let us now tke a closer look at
that implication.
According to envi
ronmental holism, individual members
of a biotic community, however large
that community might be, ought to be
preserved only if they contribute fav
orably to that community;
if they
detract from the community,
they
ought to be eliminated if possible.
The implication holds for humans as
well as nonhumans.
If the biotic com
munity would benefit, abortion, infan
ticide, and ki II i ng of certa in ad u·lts
would all be justified.
Measures rou
tinely taken with nonhuman animals
would
be
extended
justifiably
to
humans.
Now, some might think it's
high time that we take our turn.
It's
a short step from Ga rrett Ha rd in's
proposal that we not try to rescue
stranded backpackers in a wilderness
area because "I have not lately heard
that there is a shortage of people"41
to the recommendation that the human
population be "culled".
At any rate,
one certainly cannot accuse this view

of homocentrism!
What
is
the
proper
way
for
humans, as members of the biotic
community,
to live?
According to
environmental holism, they ought to
interfere with natu ral processes as
little as possible.
In particular, they
ought to resist subjecting the commu
nity to "mechanico-chemical" manipula
tion.
The most eloquent spokesman
for envi ronmental
hoi ism, J.
Bai rd
Callicott, writes that:
On the ethical question of what
to eat, it answers, not vegeta
bles instead of animals, but
orga n ica lIy
as
opposed
to
mechanico-chemically produced
food.
Purists
like
Leopold
prefer, in his expression, to
get thei r "meat f rom God,"
i.e.,
to
hunt and consume
wildlife and
to gather wild
plant foods, and thus to live
with i n the pa rameters of the
aboriginal
human
ecological
niche.
Second best. is eating
from one's own orcha rd, ga r
den, henhouse, pig pen, and
barnyard.
Third best is buy
ing or bartering organic goods
from
one's
neighbors
and
friends. 42
I have two principal objections to
environmental holism.
Each will be
considered in turn.
,. The distinction between 'natural'
and 'artificial' implicit in the quote
above
is
itself
rather
artificial.
Human beings have evolved, through
u ncontroversially
natu ral
processes,
into intelligent manipulators of their
su rroundings.
Not to employ these
manipulative abilities would be unnat
ural!
Moreover,
holists
encourage
some manipulation on our part. But it
would surely be arbitrary to approve
of a man's hunting with a bow and
arrow while frowning on his use of a
gun.
( I ncidenta Ily, t have d ifficu Ity
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seeing either practice as "getting meat
from God": the animals do not exactly
plummet
from
the
heavens
like
manna.) As regards the disapproval
of the "mechanico-chemical" produc
tion:
it is su rely true that we have
done enormous damage to animals and
the nonsentient envi ronment (not to
mention ou rselves) with ou r ma n ufac
tured fertilizers, pesticides, and her
bicides. But is it the "a rtificial ity" of
these products that makes them objec
tionable?
Suppose we were able to
produce cheaply and safely a ferti Iizer
which exactly duplicates the proper
ties of cow dung . What could possi
bly be wrong with substituting it for
the original?
If we decide that we
have been wrongfully exploiting cattle
for our own convenience (and holists
agree with animal liberations on this
poi nt, thoug h for different reasons),
and no longer breed them as we now
do, wouldn't the invention ·of the
pseudo-:cow~dung
be sa luta ry rather
than an objectionable human intrusion
on nature?
S:imilarly, suppose scientists learn
to make superb vegetable-protein sub
stitutes for chicken , beef, lamb, and
veal at reasonable cost, substitutes
which are indistinguishable from the
originals and are not harmful to make
or to eat. Untold numbers of animals
would be spa red factory fa rmi ng, we
cou Id humanely phas,e out the an imals
we have domesticated for this pur
pose, and no humans would have to
endu re meat-taste withdrawal.
Pre
sumably, envi ronmental hoi ists 'would
applaud the results of such an ,inven
tion, but they would nevertheless
condemn
the
"mechanico-chem+cal"
nature of that invention . Surely this
is misguided. The way to try to cor
rect the damag-e we h·ave done is not
to .abandon
tech nology :
by
the
hoJists' own reasoning, this would be
an unnatu ral curta i Iment of human
,abilities. Instead, we oug,ht to employ
our technology much more ~isely and
sensitively.
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It is instructive to examine holistic
criticism of a very insensitive use of
technology:
the mass production of
chicken meat and eggs. Callicott con
demns such factory-farming, but not
because of the misery and death it
inflicts on the chicken:
F rom the perspective of the
land ethic, the immoral aspect
of the factory farm has to do
fa r less with the sufferi ng .and
killing of nonhuman animals
than with the monstrous trans
formation of living things from
an organ,ic to a mechanical
mode of being. 43
It is true, as Callicott says, that we
have come to treat these as mere
machines.
The chickens are no more
than egg-assemblers and drumstick
racks.
Callicott sees this mechaniza
tion as yet another intrusion of
humans into natural processes: this is
the source of his outrage.
It seems
tome, however, that one's outrage
stems not from the use of technology
on the fa rm as such, but from the
effects of that particular tech nology
on sentient beings.
What clea rer
indication ,could there be of our total
lack of concer·n for the animals' inter
ests? They have literally been tu rned
into mere instruments for our gusta
tory gratification. At least the barn
ya rd ch icken is permitted some plea
sant ,experiences before the Day of
Reckoning!
Here the environmental holist will
prohably object that he is being
attacked for be,inga holist,one who
doesfl;ot ,re;g:ard +ndiv'idu a Is as i ntri n
siicalil'y valuable. :1 n order not to beg
si'calil'¥
the question agai n-st hoi ism, I will
p re.ssmyargurnent furthe;r in the
second objection below.
2 . The objection is th is. Envi ron
menta'l holi,sm
holi'sm ,aoe,s not regard the
fear, suffering, and anguish of sen
tient individuals, he they human or
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nonhuman, as intrinsically bad, any
more than it rega rds thei r pleasu re as
intrinsically good.
,If the biotic com
munity requires agonizing death, so
be it.
It will be a human obligation
to inflict such death in sorne cases:
not only by "getting meat from God,"
but by culling its own ranks.
The
resultant suffering and death is not a
"necessary evil," according to holism:
on Iy that wh ich ha rms the commu n ity
is evil, just as only that which ben
efits it is good.
As Callicott points
out:
Pain and pleasu re seem to have
noth i ng at a II to do with good
and evil if our appraisal is
taken from the vantage point
of ecological biology. 44
maintain that this
implication is
unacceptable from the moral point of
view.
One who clea rly, impa rtially,
and empathetically considers the agony
of
a
human
or
nonhuman
may,
depending on the circumstances, con
clude that the agony is instrumentally
good, but he or she wou Id not, I
maintain, hesitate to conclude that it
i sin t r ins i ca II y e v i I . 4 5
Callicott has a reply to this sort of
objection.
He defends this implication
of
environmental
holism, with
two
arguments.
Fi rst he poi nts out that
pain is necessary for survival: "A
living mammal which experienced no
pa in wou Id be one wh ich had a letha I
dysfu nction of the nervous system. "46
Pain is also a desirable indicator that
one has exerted oneself sufficiently to
be fit. 47
("No gain without pain! ")
Thus pain, far from being evil, is
actually desirable. This argument will
not do, however. All it shows is that
pain can be instrumentally good for
the being who experiences it.
More
over, much of the pain that human
and nonhuman animals endure is not
even in strumenta Ily good for those
individuals. The agony of a bird tor
tured for sport by a cat is in no way

edifying for the bird! Callicott would
probably answer this reply to his first
a rgument with h is second argument.
He points out that in this world sen
tient bei ngs do experience frustration,
anguish,
fear,
agony,
and death.
"That is the way the system works.
If nature as a whole is good, then
pain and death are also good. "48 But
is that if-clause fulfilled?
One can
have intense admi ration and even awe
for- the marvelously inter-connected
complexity of life as it has evolved on
this planet while at the same time
wishing that some things were other
wise.
It is fa r from obvious that a
world in which animals did not have to
eat each other to su rvive wou Id be
morally inferior to this one.
Thus,
neither of these
arguments
meets
objection (2).
Moreover, other writings by Calli
cott suggest that he ought to agree
that pain is intrinsically evil.
Else
where he argues that the ethical basis
of Leopold's view can be found in
Hume's account of the moral senti
ments.
Love and concern for the
envi ronment as a whole is . said to be
an exten s ion (not a red i rection) of
ou r natu ral sympathetic impulses from
other members of the biotic community
to the community itself:
H ume, Da rwi n, and Leopold all
recognize in addition to social
sympathies and affections for
fellow
members
of
society,
whether tribal,
national,
or
biotic, special social sentiments
the object of which is society
itself.
Patriotism is the name
of the social sentiment di rected
to the nation as a superorgan
ismic entity.
Presently there
is no name for the emergent
feel i ng, the object of wh ich is
the biosphere per se and its
several superorganismic
sub
systems.
We cou Id, perhaps,
call it bio-sentimentality. 49
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The fact is that those same moral
sentiments lead one to rega rd the suf
fering of individuals as intrinsically
evil. What the quote above suggests
is that both individuals and biotic
communities are morally considerable,
which
is contrary
to the
basic
assumption of holism.
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then not true to say that th is method
is necessarily opposed to holistic con
ceptions of value.
Therefore, objec
tion (2) to envi ronmental hoi ism has
not been met. We have good reason
to reject this conception of an envi
ronmental ethic as it stands.
F. Conclusion

At this point, an environmental
holist could attempt a radical reply to
the objection that his view has impli
cations about pain that are unaccepta
ble from the moral point of view. He
could choose to reject the moral point
of view on the ground that it is
biased in favor of individuals.
It
req u ires us to take into account the
ways in which individuals would prob
ably be affected by given actions. We
are even to empathize with those indi
viduals who are sentient.
It is not
surprising,
he might
reply,
that
holism wou Id be rejected from the
moral point of view!
Our considered
intuitions, . which are based on infor
mation gained by vivid, empathetic
awareness, are loaded in favor of
individuals.
Callicott
does
not
take
this
approach at all. He explicitly accepts
the appeal to carefully considered
moral intuitions. 50 Would he do bet
ter to reject such an appeal and to
embrace the radical reply instead?
I
th ink not.
The mora I poi nt of view
advocates nothing.
It is the method
we use to test ethical judgments. To
take into account the ways in whtch
individuals are affected or would be
affected by actions is not to be biased
in favor of individuals:
it is merely
to be informed about the situation one
is judging.
An environmental holist
who rejected this method would be
wide open to the charge that his view
is uninformed.
Finally, in objection
(5) to environmental individualism, I
argued that well-considered reflection
leads to the conclusion that richly
complex wholes as well as some indi
viduals have intrinsic value.
It is

I have argued that the homocentric
eth ic has
unacceptable impl ications
about the treatment of nonhuman ani
mals and. is an inadequate ethic for
the use of the environment.
Its
rivals, environmental individualism and
environmental holism, also have unac
ceptable
implications,
but
these
defects can be remedied: each fails in
so far as it neglects what is right
about the other.
If what I have
argued is correct, an adequate envi
ronmental eth ic shou Id
incorporate
both individual istic and hoi istic fea
tures.
What is needed is an ethic
which accords moral considerability
(1) to sentient individuals, on the
9 rounds that they have interests; (2)
to those naturally occurring individu
als which have aesthetically valuable
characteristics;
and (3)
to those
rich Iy complex wholes which have
aesthetically valuable characteristics.
All that has been said about the cri
terion of moral significance in the dis
cussion of environmental individualism
above holds, but to it must be added
the class of systems in (3).
It will
sti II be the case that, incases of
unavoidable conflict,
rights-holders
ought to have priority over beings
and systems which have no interests.
I'n cases of confl·icts betweennatu rally
occurring nonsentient individuals and
systems wh ich have aesthetic val ue,
we ought to consider (a) the conse
quences of proposed actions for the
significant interests of rights-holders
and (b) the aesthetic consequences of
those proposed actions. It will be no
easy matter to work out such con
flicts, but, if my reasoning has been
correct, work them out we must if we
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Oxford
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Press,
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pold sounds like an individualist,
such as when he suggests that the
land ethic "enlarges the boundaries
of
the
[moral]
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to
include "soils, waters, plants, and
animals" (p. 204).
However, Calli
cott argues that Leopold is really a
holist:
speaking of Leopold's defi
n itions of 'right' a nd 'wrong', he
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noteworthy and that to which atten
tion
should be directed in this
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